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1. Summary  
This rapid literature review finds that authorities use a range of methods to reduce insecurity in 
camps. Security in camps can be addressed through better planning of services by camp 
management, by more involvement of refugees, and through the use of outside security support. 
However, the militarisation of camps is a broader problem that requires political support from a 
number of stakeholders.  
The review focuses on insecurity arising from conflict (militarisation) and from crime and disputes 
within and around camps. It starts from the position that camps for refugees or internally 
displaced persons (IDPs)1 should be ‘civilian and humanitarian in character’. That is to say, they 
should not host active combatants or fighters or support conflict. They should not be attacked. 
The rights of camp residents - e.g. non-refoulment of refugees - should be respected. In the case 
of insecurity arising from crime and disputes within and around camps, security measures should 
be proportionate and consider refugee protection. 
This review surveys evaluations and academic papers on camp security management. There is a 
significant body of evidence on the problem of camp militarisation in settings including 
Zaire/DRC, Thailand, Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia. However, the review has found 
relatively little evidence on successful efforts to counter militarisation in cases of conflict. It has 
found case studies and evaluations of a number of programmes to improve lower-level camp 
security, or in cases where conflict has abated. There are several reviews of UNHCR ’security 
packages’ involving support to host state police in African countries. These lessons are focused 
on how to engage with refugee and host populations, as well as host states, and how to manage 
security services. Guidance on camp management is also surveyed. There is very little evidence 
discussing liaison arrangements beyond stating the need to provide protection training and 
oversight for security forces; and the need for principled engagement with states and non-state 
conflict parties. 
The review first outlines UNHCR guidance on camp management and maintaining the civilian 
and humanitarian character of camps, and outlines the UNHCR's policies on camp security, as it 
is the most influential refugee organisation. It then discusses case studies touching on measures 
to improve security in camps, through 'security packages' and other measures. The four case 
studies are from Africa and have been selected based on the availability of sources that discuss 
camp management options. Other cases (e.g. Lebanon, Zaire, Thailand) have generated 
literature outlining factors leading to militarisation (with some discussion of failures by 
humanitarian actors) but not discussion or evaluation of solutions. The review then discusses 
broad 'lessons' derived from the case studies and other relevant literature on camp security. 
The report finds that: 
• Efforts to improve security by recruiting or training more police and community policing 
initiative can be effective in reducing crime and disorder in camps. Police should be 
professional, be trained in refugee protection, and preferably include a significant 
 
1 The term refugees is used in the report, although in some cases the camps discussed may contain IDPs, as 
security issues are similar for both groups. However, refugees have a distinct legal status. 
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proportion of female staff. In some cases, host state police or community police behave 
unaccountably. Capacity building is therefore required in many cases. 
• State priorities can lead to ‘securitisation’. Refugees are seen as a security threat, and 
policies and practices focus on reducing this threat rather than upholding refugee rights.  
• Protection training should be offered by UNHCR (or another organisation), and 
coordination between protection officers and security staff is important.  
• Clear agreements should be made with host governments or security contractors to 
outline duties and ensure that protection concerns are central. Governments may be 
persuaded to help maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of camps. 
• Military forces and police are the responsibility of host states. In some cases, policing 
functions may be undertaken by commercial parties. Camp management agencies 
should ensure that any security measures undertaken by these parties are proportionate 
and respect the rights of inmates. In cases where camp management (often the UNHCR 
or an NGO) has funded supplementary policing, it should ensure that it has adequate 
oversight through robust agreements. This should include effective working agreements 
that allow relevant training and protection issues to be highlighted and acted on. 
• Attention should be paid to the place of the camp in the local economy, as camps can 
generate tensions with local populations, particularly if the latter have or perceive they 
have lower standards of living than camp populations. 
• Refugees should be engaged through democratic committees and consultations on 
security measures. Informal and traditional forms of security and justice within camps 
should be acknowledged and can form part of effective security measures, although care 
must be taken in reconciling community norms with national law, and serious crimes 
should usually be referred to national justice systems. 
• Militarisation is a significant problem that requires co-operation with armed forces. In 
such cases, humanitarian actors rely on the support of host states or international forces 
to separate combatants/fighters from refugees, protect camps and remove arms. 
• There is no evidence that humanitarian actors have been able to address insecurity 
arising from militarisation in conflict settings where the host state or non-state armed 
forces are not co-operative. They may use diplomacy, ‘turn a blind eye’ or choose to 
leave in such situations. 
• Humanitarian actors should monitor military-led de-militarisation processes to ensure that 
combatants/fighters’ rights are respected. 
• Humanitarian actors in charge of camps may help address ‘intermediate causes’ of 
insecurity. For example, de-militarisation can be aided with open political discussion, 
refugee access to information on their state of origin and its political developments, and 
viable options for their future (e.g. resettlement or disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration [DRR]). Education, open discussion and services in camps can help reduce 
some causes of insecurity. 
  




The report uses the term security to refer to problems related to crime, militarisation and 
safety in camps or similar sites. It is important to note that the terminology is used slightly 
differently by different actors. Notably, security usually comes under the umbrella of ‘protection’ 
in the humanitarian sector, although protection is a broader concept covering refugees’ basic 
legal rights as well as protection from physical threats (Hoffmann, 2017, p. 100). While UNHCR 
traditionally focused on the material security of refugees, the mid-1990s saw calls for a greater 
focus on physical protection. Security is also the concern of states who fear that instability will be 
caused by migration, although states do not always centre humanitarian concerns in their 
conceptions of security (Hoffmann, 2017, p. 100).  
According to the camp management toolkit: “security refers to the protection of an agency’s staff 
from deliberate threats or acts of violence. Protection refers to the risk of violence against civilian 
noncombatant populations that are not an agency’s staff. Safety refers to accidental hazards 
such as road accidents, fire, diseases and natural disasters. There is generally no intention to 
harm and relates to both camp residents and staff” (IOM et al., 2015, p. 170). In this report, 
security is used to refer to all efforts to prevent crime and military activity in camps. Protection is 
used to refer to the protection of refugees’ basic rights. 
The review focuses on camps for refugees or internally displaced persons. In most cases, 
camps are managed by a humanitarian organisation. In many cases, the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) holds responsibility for camps, although it may subcontract 
work to humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), or security work to host state 
police, UN agencies or private security providers.  
Camps for refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs) can suffer from security 
problems. These take a number of forms, including (IOM et al., 2015; Jacobsen, 1999, pp. 15–
18):  
• Petty and organised crime within and outside of camps; 
• Sexual- and gender-based violence; 
• Violence between refugees (e.g. from different political factions or ethnic groups); 
• Violence between refugees and host communities outside of camps; 
• The use of camps as military bases (‘militarisation’); 
• Forced recruitment of refugees into armed conflict; 
• Storing of arms by armed groups; 
• Acts of terrorism; and  
• Fires arising from overcrowded settlements and lack of safety planning. 
This report is focused on insecurity in the form of violence, proliferation of weapons, and 
militarisation. It pays particular attention to the role of liaison between camp management 
organisations and national governments and security actors. It does not consider measures to 
reduce sexual- and gender-based violence specifically, on which there is a large body of 
evidence. 
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The responsibility for the security of refugee camps lies with the host state. However, in 
many cases the host state may be unwilling or unable to do much to ensure security. As such the 
UNHCR, which runs many camps, has increasingly sought to improve security in camps. In other 
cases, camps may be controlled by host state military forces, which may provide only limited 
access to humanitarian actors. In the case of camps for Palestinians in Lebanon, the UN Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA) has limited control over the camps or security, with 
political factions within camps and the Lebanese army exercising most influence. This review has 
mostly found evidence relating to camps run by UNHCR or NGOs. 
Camp management consists of various services and functions such as registration, 
sanitation and food supply. Responsibilities relating to security include camp safety for staff 
and refugees (IOM et al., 2015). International law sets out a division of labour on refugee 
protection (Janmyr, 2014). Host governments are responsible for security, law and order, and 
maintaining the civilian character of camps. However, camp management agencies have a 
considerable role in addressing refugee needs that may contribute to insecurity, identifying 
problems, liaising with security services, ensuring that the rights of camp residents are 
respected. In practice, they often have considerable input into the management of security. 
This review focused on security in camps, but the literature emphasises that security has 
many dimensions and is not limited to policing functions. For example, all authors agree 
that poor conditions for refugees are one factor among others that may lead to crime or 
radicalisation. Refugee conditions are not a security concern per se, but should be considered in 
assessing security. There are also dimensions of security management that go beyond the remit 
and capabilities of humanitarian actors managing camps, such as the activities of armed groups. 
The role of armed groups may be addressed through liaison with national security forces or UN 
peacekeepers.  
The nature of camps can create particular security problems through: 
• Boredom and frustration; 
• Lack of education, opportunities and meaningful options for the future; 
• Insufficient policing, or arbitrary and brutal policing. 
• Conflict with ‘host’ populations arising from differential access to resources; 
• Changing social structures (e.g. loss of traditional male breadwinners roles is often 
argued to be a cause of domestic violence); and 
• Size and layout of camps may create particular vulnerabilities (e.g. lack of lighting). 
Some of the most difficult security problems in the camps have broader political causes: 
• Militarisation is driven by conflict dynamics, which often cross borders. In some cases, 
the host state may tolerate militarisation because of its stance in a particular conflict 
(Jacobsen, 1999).  
• Refugees’ willingness to join or support armed groups may also be driven by the political 
situation that has caused them to flee. 
• Attitudes to crime and justice, as well as inter-group conflict, may stem from refugees’ 
pre-existing justice systems (e.g. customs of ‘blood money’), making them more or less 
amenable to host state laws or international norms.  
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Responsibilities of different actors 
The responsibility for the security of camps falls on the host state (Janmyr, 2014). If the 
state is unwilling or unable to do this, international law is not clear on what should happen. In 
Africa states, in particular, the UNHCR or NGOs are often in control of camp security in practice 
(Janmyr, 2014). Janmyr argues that in reality, neither states, the UNHCR nor NGOs fully 
exercise security functions alone “and do not as such take on full responsibility for the physical 
safety of refugees and IDPs in these camps” (Janmyr, 2014, p. 20). 
In practice, NGOs are “increasingly delegated typical protection tasks related to security 
and administration of refugee camps” (Janmyr, 2014, p. 321). NGOs often provide ‘protection 
officers’ when there are no UNHCR protection staff (a chief security officer normally works under 
UNHCR supervision). NGOs involved in camp management are often better able to detect 
security threats: “in Albania, for instance, UNHCR ‘removed’ armed elements from a refugee 
camp following their discovery by local NGOs” (Janmyr, 2014, p. 313). However, they must 
address security threats in liaison with other actors, notably state authorities and UN security 
forces. 
Options 
The security of camps has taken greater prominence in recent years. Following the 
militarisation of camps in the Great Lakes region during 1994-7, UNHCR and others put greater 
emphasis on physical protection measures (Jacobsen, 1999, p. 9). In 1999, the UNHCR 
formulated a ladder of options to deal with camp insecurity. These progress from “relatively 
‘soft’ initiatives, primarily preventative measures and collaboration with national law enforcement 
authorities, to ‘intermediary’ initiatives, which involve the use of international civilian or police 
monitors who provide technical expertise and support for local authorities, to relatively ‘hard’ 
options, such as the deployment of “multinational military forces” (Janmyr, 2014, p. 139; see also 
Opaye, 2005, pp. 12-15; UNHCR, 2006, p. 45). The latter requires UN Security Council support. 
Other methods of improving camp security include: 
• Camp planning: considering the placement of camps (e.g. away from conflict zones or 
considering the effect of differences in wealth between camp and host populations); 
adequate provision of infrastructure and services (e.g. education). 
• Refugee management: encouraging refugee committees and community policing to allow 
internal social order to develop.  
• Paying for extra security staff: This may take the form of either or a combination of host 
state security forces, those recruited from refugee populations or private contractors. 
Many host states do not have the capacity to fund extra security staff so it is recognised 
that the international community may fund extra police. UNHCR should also work to 
ensure security staff understand refugee protection issues. 
For example, SURGE (Supporting UNHCR Resources on the Ground with Experts on 
mission) is run by the UNHCR and the International Rescue Committee (IRC).2 It is meant for 
 
2 http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16a15b6.html 
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situations where there are refugee protection concerns, but limited staff to address them. 
Under the initiative, the NGO running a camp recruits staff to undertake physical security, 
arrest and detention and border monitoring functions. The staff have ‘dual status’ as they 
work for the recruiting NGO but are also ‘experts on mission’ for the UN. SURGE is used in 
over 120 field offices (Janmyr, 2014, p. 322). 
• Liaison with host state militaries or militaries belonging to international organisations. 
This is particularly important in cases where camps have become ‘militarised’ or are 
under attack. 
• Advocacy for humanitarian positions on protection and humanitarian character of camps. 
Security measures can present refugees as a ‘threat’ and can impinge on their rights 
through arbitrary policing, brutal methods or involuntary repatriation or relocation. It is, 
therefore, important that humanitarian organisations ensure that security measures are 
proportionate. 
3. Guidance and policies 
IOM, NRC, & UNHCR. (2015). Camp management toolkit 
This guidance on camp management produced by the UNHCR, Norwegian Refugee Council, 
International Organisation for Migration, and International Committee of the Red Cross. It 
outlines the main responsibilities of camp management, security threats that may arise, and 
operational measures that can be used to address them. It does not assess the effectiveness of 
these measures. 
The guidance outlines the respective responsibilities of states and organisations in charge of 
camp management. The “provision of security, maintenance of law and order and guaranteeing 
the civilian character of a camp are the responsibilities of the national authorities” (IOM et al., 
2015, p. 172). Nevertheless, “camp population safety and staff security is an essential 
component of camp management” (IOM et al., 2015, p. 171). 
The role of the camp management agency is to act as “facilitator for the coordination of security 
in the camp” (IOM et al., 2015, p. 171). This may include “nomination of a security focal point 
(potentially assisted by a security expert or adviser) to conduct security risk assessments and 
carry out ongoing analysis” (IOM et al., 2015, p. 172). The risk assessment may inform the 
design and running of the camp, in terms of layout, services, allocation of resources and 
responses to specific threats identified. Measures can include separating refugees from different 
origins, considering the placement of lighting, facilities and activities for residents, deployment of 
trained police, community assistance with security.  
In cases where camps are threatened by attacks from armed groups, or contain active 
combatants or fighters, the military or security services of the host state may have a role in 
providing some sort of security or support. However, close liaison arrangements are necessary to 
ensure that humanitarian objectives are not compromised (IOM et al., 2015, p. 179). 
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UNHCR and ICRC (2018). Aide memoire: Operational guidance on maintaining the civilian 
and humanitarian character of sites and settlements  
Guidance produced by the ICRC and the UNHCR outlines the problems raised by the potential 
‘militarisation’ of camps. This may take the form of civilians in camps supporting conflict parties 
through propaganda, recruitment, training or supplies. Weapons may be stored in camps. 
Combatants and fighters may enter or reside in the camps. Camps may be attacked by conflict 
parties. 
In order to maintain their protection under international humanitarian law, camps must be 
maintained as civilian sites. This requires distinguishing combatants and fighters from civilians 
(Arnold, 2018, pp. 11–15).3 If a site contains combatants or fighters, or is used for military 
purposes, it is not entitled to protection from attack in international humanitarian law. It is 
therefore important to prevent combatants and fighters from entering camps. However, it can be 
more difficult to identify civilians who take part in hostilities while accommodated in camps. 
Civilians in camps may also undertake activities to support a party to conflict - e.g. recruitment or 
training of armed forced - which do not affect the protection of the camps in international 
humanitarian law (IHL), but do undermine the humanitarian character and possibly endanger the 
camps (Arnold, 2018, p. 15). Protection risks can arise from expelling individuals for their 
contribution to a war effort or combatant status, e.g. if they are identified by the opposing party, 
or subject to refoulement (Arnold, 2018, p. 15).  
The guidance outlines several measures humanitarian actors can take to address these issues. 
States are responsible for maintaining the civilian and humanitarian character of camps, and may 
undertake ‘screening’ to prevent combatants entering camps. This may involve border security, 
immigration authorities, police or the army. A UN peace operation may undertake screening in 
some situations. Humanitarian actors should "monitor the situation to ensure that the authorities 
strike the right balance between security and humanitarian considerations" (p. 17). It also 
recommends registering persons with specific protection risks and engaging in protection 
dialogue to prevent violations (e.g. refoulement4 or improper search procedures). 
It addresses the issue of separation, whereby those identified as combatants or fighters are 
separated from civilians. If combatants or fighters are deprived of their liberty by national/UN 
authorities, then humanitarian actors (depending on their mandate) should consider measures to 
ensure that this is done according to international humanitarian law and international refugee law 
(e.g. allowing humanitarian access; safe conditions of detention; and non-refoulement). These 
measures include engaging in protection dialogue; providing material assistance; or advocating 
for specific protection needs. 
The longer-term solution of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) may also be 
used to separate fighters/combatants from civilians and improve the overall security situation.  
DDR can be implemented when there is a peace agreement in place. Humanitarian actors may 
 
3 Combatants refers to members of a state's armed forced in an international armed conflict, whereas fighters is 
used to designate members of a state's armed forces or a non-state armed group in a non-international armed 
conflict. 
4 Returning an asylum seeking against their will to a state where they face likely danger of persecution. Non-
refoulement is enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
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be able to explore the possibility of implementing alternative programmes (pre-DDR programmes 
or community violence reduction programmes). 
It also recommends mitigation measures: 
• Reducing exposure to risk by locating the camp away from insecure areas; securing the 
site; identifying those ‘at risk’ of recruitment; the use of police. 
• Community-based measures to discuss the concerns of camp residents, raise awareness 
of their rights, provide channels to report protection issues, and programmes deemed 
likely to reduce this risk. 
• Dialogue with government authorities and non-state parties to conflict to ensure 
protection concerns are raised and acted on. 
International military forces are cited as a ‘hard’ option on the UNHCR’s ladder of options to deal 
with camp insecurity. A 2001 conference on the possibility emphasised that any international 
military force would need a “clear and enforceable mandate, a clearly defined concept of 
operations and rules of engagement ” (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, 2001, p. 2). It 
could be negotiated by UN, coalition or regional organisation, or bilaterally between host country 
and troop contributing country, or between the host and UNHCR or similar agency.  
Its potential tasks could be: “monitoring, surveillance, intelligence gathering and reconnaissance; 
liaison with national military forces, training and capacity building; and assessment, analysis and 
advice for humanitarian organizations; separation, disarmament and demobilization of 
combatants; capture/escort of war criminals; stabilization (border and arms control) and 
perimeter security” (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, 2001, p. 3) 
The conference emphasised the careful delineation of roles. International forces should be in 
support of humanitarian objectives. They should be supported by diplomatic efforts. They should 
be distinct from camp police. 
Other relevant guidance from earlier includes UNHCR’s Manual on Security of Persons of 
Concern (2011). The manual outlines potential threats to persons of concern and possible 
responses. It points to relevant law and guidance and suggests processes to address these 
risks. UNHCR’s Camp Security Guidelines (2003) outlines broad approaches to security 
problems, ranging from minor crimes, to serious crimes, to serious violations of humanitarian or 
human rights, to militarisation (pp. 161-4). However, it does not provide details on implementing 
its recommendations, e.g. it lists deploying regional police as a possible response to 
militarisation, but does not detail liaison arrangements with police. 
4. Case studies 
Kenya 
Since the early 1990s Kenya has hosted a large number of refugees from countries 
including Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. There has been considerable insecurity in the two 
largest camps, Kakuma and Dadaab (Crisp, 2000). Violence in Kakuma is driven by factors 
including poverty, trauma, frustration and boredom; inter-group tensions; robberies by Kenyans 
living around the camps; police/refugee violence; and cultural forms of violence such as gender-
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based violence (Jansen, 2011, p. 85). The camps were also used by armed groups such as what 
was then southern Sudan’s SPLA. Dadaab and Kakuma are both considerably larger than the 
UNCHR’s recommended maximum of 20,000 inhabitants. 
Soft security measures 
Within Kakuma, UNHCR instituted several programmes and changes to improve security. 
Refugee initiatives and customs also affected the security situation in the camp. These included:  
• The development of community structures, and use of community gaols in the camp, with 
minimal monitoring by UNHCR (Jansen, 2011, pp. 62-70). 
• The institution of refugee committees: a camp peace/security committee; a Zonal Peace/ 
Security Committee; and a Joint Peace / Security committee. The function of these 
committees was to detect “early warning signs of tension/conflict build up in the 
community; identify those with ill motives and motivate them to participate in peace 
building activities; carry out awareness on peace education and security issues in the 
community; and community policing on peace and security in the communities” (Jansen, 
2011, p. 65). 
• Education for children and adolescents and Peace Education Programmes (PEP) run by 
UNHCR. They taught methods of conflict resolution and human rights issues. 
• Initiatives to counter specific threats, such as a firewood project so refugees did not have 
to be exposed to threats finding wood outside camps, or a mobile court system to 
educate refugees about how to access Kenyan justice. 
• Site planning to separate ethnic groups, or provide lockable doors for blocks (Crisp, 
2000, p. 60). 
• Help to local populations surrounding the camps, such as water catchments (Crisp, 2000, 
p. 60). 
As well as the role of these programmes, Jansen (2011) also points to changing attitudes 
among refugees and host communities (Turkana pastoralists) as they got used to the 
situation. He suggests initially, high levels of violence were in part a process of ‘boundary 
setting’ between communities (Jansen, 2011, p. 12). 
The limitations of these security measures include that community conceptions of justice 
do not always coincide with Kenyan law or international norms (Jansen, 2011, p. 71). For 
example, community authorities may prevent refugees from reporting crimes to the Kenyan 
police. 
A 2005 evaluation of refugee protection in Kenyan camps argues that increased policing 
has been effective at reducing crime in camps (Turton, 2005). However, UNHCR’s role in 
protecting arrested refugees was not supported by formal instructions and was somewhat ad 
hoc. The report points to the issue of the detention of refugees by Kenyan authorities. It suggests 
most refugees arrests take place outside of camps ad the “UNHCR generally has no difficulty 
accessing people in detention, usually due to the co-operative approach of the officers in charge 
rather than any Ministerial instructions or standard operating procedures requiring officers to 
inform or cooperate with UNHCR. There have, however, been difficulties securing access to 
persons detained at the Nairobi Airport” (Turton, 2005, pp. 33-4). Some detentions are arbitrary 
but this is judged to be caused by a lack of capacity in the justice system (Turton, 2005, p. 43). 
Hard security measures 
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UNHCR is responsible for refugee protection and services, while the Kenyan government 
maintains law and order in camps (Jansen, 2011, p. 44). Security forces are drawn from both 
the refugee and host populations (Crisp, 2000, p. 7). The Administration Police (AP) and the 
paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU) provided security support to Dadaab and Kakuma. 
UNHCR has supplemented the salaries of police and civil servants, as well as building offices for 
the police (Jansen, 2011, p. 47).  
The Security Partnership Project (SPP) was an agreement between UNHCR and the 
government of Kenya. 2011-14 UNHCR paid USD 25 million for fuel subsidies, staff housing 
and allowances for the police. The partnership has led to increased raids and militarisation 
(Brankamp, 2019). Police can impose curfews and other security measures, and often act 
arbitrarily and violently (Brankamp, 2019). Brankamp (2019) argues that UNHCR’s funding of 
police suggests a ‘quiet toleration’ of its ‘punitive policing’. 
Kakuma did host armed groups and contributed to militarisation. Although not supporting 
the rebels directly, the Kenyan government allowed safe passage of SPLA members from Sudan 
to Kenya, because of US and other support for the SPLA and its lack of threat to Kenya in 
comparison to al Shabaab (Jansen, 2011, p. 243). According to Jansen (2011, p. 111), UNHCR 
enacted a policy of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’. 
Uganda 
Camps held a large number of Sudanese refugees in Uganda in the late 1990s/early 2000s. 
Uganda tolerated recruitment by the Sudanese rebel group the SPLA, and could not protect 
against attacks by Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army. 
There was ‘chronic insecurity’ in northern Uganda, but UNHCR overlooked refugee safety. 
Its priorities were focused on encouraging refugee ‘self-reliance’ and it failed to acknowledge 
protection concerns (Janmyr, 2014, p. 286). For instance, to cultivate land as part of the self-
reliance policy, refugees had to live in an insecure region. The Ugandan government promised to 
augment security in the region, but the army was incapable of doing this. 
UNHCR had limited protection monitoring capacity - this was delegated to implementing 
partners, and limited by poor office organisation at UNHCR (Janmyr, 2014, p. 289). It played a 
‘negligible’ role in preventing SPLA and forced recruitment. It did provide warnings of 
militarisation to local army and government officials, but ignored that the Ugandan government 
had a role in supporting the SPLA (Janmyr, 2014, p. 295). 
The Ugandan government forcibly relocated refugees from the relatively safe Achol-Pii 
camp to a violent area near the border with Sudan (Janmyr, 2014, p. 293). This created a 
diplomatic rift with UNHCR. However, Janmry (2014, p. 296) argues that UNHCR’s protests were 
insufficient: 
While it is fairly clear that UNHCR pursued some form of diplomacy efforts towards the 
Ugandan government with regard to the location of the Sudanese refugee camps, as well 
as a range of delaying and blocking tactics against moving the refugees to the north, it is 
disconcerting to learn that UNHCR not once came out forcefully to protest the relocation 
of the Achol-pii refugees.  
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Janmyr highlights the difficulties of UNHCR’s position and notes its limited options: quiet 
diplomacy, reporting on violations, or physical withdrawal (Janmyr, 2014, p. 296) 
Tanzania 
In the late 1990s, a large number of mainly Hutu refugees who had fled from Rwanda 
resided in camps in Tanzania. Many Burundian refugees already resided in Tanzania following 
previous conflicts. Security problems identified in the camps centre were: 
• Crime within the camps (e.g. violence between groups of refugees); 
• Militarisation of refugees by Burundian armed groups. 
For example, threats that came to light in 1997-1999 included arms caches, military training by 
male refugees, and reports of food taxes to armed groups (Durieux, 2000). 
Residents were not organised according to communes of origin in an attempt to reduce 
communal tensions. However, there are elected block leaders with varying levels of 
effectiveness, and there was tension between political factions (ICG, 1999). 
UNHCR and the government of Tanzania developed a ‘security package’ to deal with these 
problems. UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Tanzanian government 
whereby it met the cost of posting police officers in the camps. UNHCR paid for allowances, 
equipment, vehicles and accommodation for the officers (Crisp, 2001, p. 3). The package also 
involved recruiting refugee watchmen and women (sungu sungus) to “patrol the camps, report 
incidents to the police and generally assist in the maintenance of law and order” (Crisp, 2001, p. 
3). 
The security package came about through co-operation between the UNHCR and the 
government of Tanzania. They undertook a joint mission to Kigoma and Kagera regions to 
assess whether the camps had become militarised in May 1997 (Durieux, 2000, p. 3). The 
mission made a ‘diplomatic concession’ in stating that the camps were not militarised but that 
some refugees may ‘engage in political activities’. “The joint assessment mission of May 1997 
was the preamble to lengthy, indeed ongoing, negotiations between the government of Tanzania 
and UNHCR about the nature and origin of those threats and the most appropriate ways to 
respond to them” (Durieux, 2000, p. 4). 
UNHCR’s evaluation found the following broadly positive results (Crisp, 2001, p. 4): 
• Improving police morale and operational effectiveness; 
• Preserving law and order; 
• Introducing police officers to the principles of refugee protection and community policing;  
• Limiting the overt politicisation and militarisation of refugee camps; 
• Reinforcing the security of humanitarian personnel; 
• Averting conflict between refugees and local populations; and 
• Enhancing relations between UNHCR and the Tanzanian authorities. 
The report noted a conducive context: the report stated that Tanzania is peaceful with an 
effective police force, tradition of refuge, and a tradition of ‘sungu sungu’ community policing on 
which to draw (Crisp, 2001). 
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It notes a number of practical issues related to the package: 
• There might be a problem of dependency as host authorities in poor countries may seek 
other goods and services from organisations like UNHCR. 
• Incentives are needed to recruit police officers, but relatively high pay can create 
resentment among other workers in the country. Careful attention should, therefore, be 
given to remuneration. 
• The quality of policing is also important: “ensuring that an adequate number of suitably 
qualified international security advisors are present from the initial establishment of a 
security package, so as to undertake the tasks of training, monitoring and mentoring; 
placing particular emphasis on the introduction of community policing methods, and 
encouraging police officers to play an active role in the prevention of domestic, sexual 
and gender-based violence; encouraging the authorities to deploy an adequate number 
of female police officers on the security package; insisting that the authorities take 
disciplinary action against any police officer engaging in unprofessional or abusive 
behaviour; introducing a code of conduct for security package police, including provisions 
concerning the relationship between male police officers and refugee women” (Crisp, 
2001, p. 7) 
• It was hard to recruit enough female police officers in areas where there are fewer 
anyway. 
• Having an international agency in control of security and law, traditionally a state 
function, may create tensions. 
• If members of a country's police force have been sent to improve security in camps, other 
areas of the country may suffer from a lack of policing. Donors and relevant agencies 
should therefore lend support to make sure seconding police to refugee camps does not 
lead to deterioration of security elsewhere. 
• Refugee watchmen and women (sungu sungus) may be biased towards certain groups 
or factions within the camps. Police may also encourage them to undertake functions for 
which they are not trained. 
• It was found to be difficult in practice to remove armed exiles. Many were imprisoned 
then released, partly because of questions over the legal grounds for segregation in 
Tanzanian law (Crisp, 2001, p. 8). 
Security measures within camps need to be linked to security actors outside the camps. 
Due to resource limitations, it was only able to address ‘overt militarisation’ (Crisp, 2001; ICG, 
1999, p. 15). While issues outside the camp were within the remit of the police, in practice, they 
did not have the resources to address this (Durieux, 2000). Policing the camps was not effective 
in the sense that it ignores militancy outside the camps. Militant refugees may find it easier to 
access resources in the camps if the camps are quiet and, therefore, not attracting scrutiny (ICG, 
1999, p. 17). Crisp (2001, p. 5) points to the need for “effective co-operation between 
UNHCR’s field security advisors and its protection staff” and close coordination with the 
UNHCR office in the refugees’ country of origin. Liaison with the military may be required to 
deal with border security. 
The weaknesses of the security package related to its inability to address the underlying 
causes of crime and militarisation. Crisp notes that the package cannot address root causes 
of crime of militarisation - hardship, lack of opportunity, border, and uncertainty over their future. 
Security should, therefore, be “supported by and integrated with UNHCR’s whole range of 
protection, programme and community services activities” (Crisp, 2001, p. 5).  
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Durieux (2000) emphasises the importance of addressing ‘intermediate causes’ of crime 
and militarisation among refugees. He argues that security measures are insufficient on their 
own. This includes better conditions for refugees, and more advocacy of humanitarian positions 
to armed actors and governments. 
A key intermediate cause of crime and militarisation is a lack of purpose among youth. 
Taking up arms is partly a response to anger and frustration. Education in camps is very limited, 
but young people need meaningful activities and a future (Durieux, 2000). 
It is argued that UNHCR can advocate effectively for humanitarian concerns. Durieux 
(2000) notes that refugees are not persuaded to join armed groups purely through persuasion or 
intimidation by political leaders, and that many are already sympathetic to certain causes. The 
UNHCR should not foster debate on such issues, but could do more ‘to get its humanitarian 
concerns through to those parties that are known to exercise the most militant influence on the 
refugee populations’. In this case, parties in Burundi’s conflict were at peace negotiations, 
making’ “it easier for UNHCR, preferably in unison with the peace process facilitation team 
and/or the government of Tanzania, to voice its concerns and explain its principled position, inter 
alia on the issue of separation and internment” (Durieux, 2000, p. 7). 
More engagement with refugees is also seen to be an effective method of discouraging 
militancy. The discussion of political questions affecting the refugees, and participation in peace 
processes, should be encouraged. However, both the Tanzanian government and NGOs were 
keen to suppress or deny the existence of any ‘political’ activity in camps (ICG, 1999).  ICG 
states that Tanzanian authorities relied on ‘iron fist’ tactics to maintain the camps as civilian 
space: “UNHCR exercises a soft approach for political leaders who make themselves known 
privately in order to engage with UNHCR. The hard approach is reserved for political and military 
leaders who do not come forward; if they are caught, they may be turned over to local authorities. 
The effect of this policy has been to drive the military leaders, a secretive group anyway, further 
underground” (ICG, 1999, p. 17). 
The ICG argues that efforts to suppress militarisation by suppressing political mobilisation can be 
ineffective. NGOs ‘have advocated against’ any form of political mobilisation, but should instead 
‘present refugees with alternatives’ to the views of hardliners. This is partly with the militarisation 
of camps in Zaire [now DRC] in mind (ICG, 1999, p. 16). Refugees were frustrated by a lack of 
news about Burundi. Most knew little about the UN or the humanitarian system (ICG, 1999, p. 
18). They highlight the potential of participatory activities and information for the refugees. 
Advocacy of humanitarian and security measures should also be undertaken with 
governments and armed actors. The operation of international refugee agreements is reliant 
on contracting parties. Therefore, Durieux argues that “governments must be led to understand 
that it is not in their interest - much less in the refugees’ interest - to deny security problems, or to 
present them as a failure of humanitarian relief programmes” and points to the role of UNHCR’s 
‘friendly advice’ (Durieux, 2000, p. 8). Durieux (2000) emphasises that the “humanitarian 
principles for which UNHCR stands can retain or regain credibility through a transparent 
statement of the problem to those primarily responsible for it. On specific issues of particular 
concern, UNHCR may even hope to influence the armed opposition’s practice” (Durieux, 2000, p. 
7) 
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Crisp (2001, p. 5) points to the role of legal experts in promoting respect for international 
refugee law. In this case, female Tanzanian lawyers in UNHCR’s offices “provided the 
organization with a valuable channel of communication with the police, local authorities and 
judiciary” (Crisp, 2001, p. 5). 
Guinea 
Between 1999 and 2004, Guinea’s refugee camps became a base for militarisation as part 
of the conflict in Liberia (Milner, 2005). After the end of the Liberian civil war, UNHCR pushed 
to relocate the camps away from the borders with Sierra Leone and Liberia, repatriate the Sierra 
Leonean refugees, and resettle others. As part of this, the Guinean police, supervised by a 
government body, searched refugees for weapons. Military escorts protected refugees as they 
moved. While the UNHCR adjudged the relocation to be a successful strategy, other sources 
point to continued militarisation and violence in some cases (Milner, 2005, p. 156). For example, 
the NGO managing Kouankan camp was forced to withdraw after accusations it was informing 
on rebel activities to the Liberian government (Milner, 2005, p. 156). Some refugees also refused 
to move from border areas for personal reasons (marriage) or fear, and thus lacked humanitarian 
assistance. 
Another response to security problems in camps was the formation of the Brigade Mixt de 
Sécurité (BMS) by the government in 2001. It consisted of Guinean police and irregulars. The 
BMS were equipped and trained by UNHCR. The BMS exhibited unprofessional behaviour and 
criminal behaviour - “it was found that some members of the BMS were engaged in illegal 
activities in the camps, including sexual exploitation of refugee women and children” (Milner, 
2005, p. 158). 
The Canadian police ran a training programme for the BMS and worked to co-ordinate 
between BMS, the government and the UNHCR, in 2003-4. It was found to reduce crime in 
camps, but its success was limited by several factors (LeBlanc and Herrman, 2005): 
• UNHCR usually provides protection training to government and security officials, but 
none was given to BMS as UNHCR assumed Canadian police would do this (p. 10). BMS 
were thus untrained on protection issues. Policing in the camps did not integrate 
protection concerns. 
• BMS became ‘comfortable’ and unprofessional in their roles, and unhappy at a lack of 
pay. The Canadian police asked them to be rotated, but the replacement contingent was 
untrained. They were also illiterate, which meant it was difficult to train them to an 
acceptable standard. 
• The Guinean government was not co-operative, i.e. it sent a poor quality contingent of 
BMS. UNHCR and the governments should have delineated responsibilities and 
commitments more clearly. 
• The transition was unsustainable and no institutional structures were in place to continue 
training. 
• There were lots of implementation problems. The time frame was perhaps too short for 
the training needed. 
• Details such as budget, transport and office space were not clear, and made working 
arrangements difficult. BMS lacked proper equipment to patrol camps (e.g. 
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communications equipment), partly from UNHCR reluctance to hand over equipment they 
feared would be misused. 
5. Lessons 
Camp planning 
The UNHCR recommends that refugee camps should be situated more than 50km from borders 
and contain no more than 20,000 refugees. Other recommendations for physical features to 
improve safety and security include adequate spacing of buildings, adequate lighting to deter 
attacks, and perimeter security (Atiyeh & Gunn, 2017). However, planning can be more focused 
on ‘control’ than ‘safety’ in some cases (Dalal et al., 2018; Hoffmann, 2017) 
Securitisation 
Some authors argue that seeing refugees as a threat to host state security and aid 
workers can undermine the humanitarian functions of camps (Brankamp, 2019; Hoffmann, 
2017; O’Driscoll, 2017). As such, some camps are designed to minimise security threats and do 
not pay adequate attention to refugees’ needs and rights. Hoffman (2017) analyses Azraq camp, 
built for Syrian refugees in Jordan. Following insecurity in Zataari camp (UNHCR et al., 2014, p. 
8), Azraq has been planned to limit the ability of refugees to congregate. ‘Village clusters’ are 
used to organise refugees, which has the dual function of allowing family members to live 
together, and making them easy to isolate by security forces. Technology such as monitored 
money cards, allows refugees to be digitally surveilled. State policies often focus on security 
concerns, which can lead state security forces to neglect or undermine refugees’ legal protection 
(e.g. heavy-handed policing in camps; refoulement of refugees). In some cases, camp 
management agencies may fail to counter security policies which infringe on camp residents' 
rights (Brankamp, 2017). 
Need to consider security and refugee life holistically 
A RAND Corporation analysis of the problem of camp militarisation argues that “a combination of 
refugee self-empowerment, tightened internal security in camps, and security assistance to host 
country police forces is showing some success in mitigating risks if it is tailored to local needs” 
(Sude et al., 2015, p. 11). Addressing security narrowly defined in physical terms without 
addressing refugee needs may be counterproductive. Similarly, addressing overt militancy in 
camps in a harsh manner may drive it underground and harden resolve, or leave militancy 
outside camps unaddressed. 
Security measures can have unintended consequences. “In Juba, South Sudan, the United 
Nations staff has tightened security within the main camp and controls entry in co-operation with 
government security forces ... this has deterred militancy but restricted mobility and economic 
opportunities for refugees, increasing refugee frustration, violent scuffles, and petty crime” (Sude 
et al., 2015, p. 11). Hard line tactics can drive militant elements underground (ICG, 1999).  
Moreover, militant groups may benefit from de-militarised camps if they can still use them as a 
safe haven and source of food and shelter. 
Most analyses point to the need to engage with refugees and consider refugees long-term 
aspirations. For instance, Lischer points to the importance of a ‘long-term alternative’ for 
   
 
17 
persuading refugee fighters to renounce violent means, which is most likely to be enabled by a 
peace agreement (Lischer, 2005, p. 139). Education for youth and livelihoods opportunities are 
important outlets for refugees in camps (Durieux, 2000). Security measures or labour restrictions 
imposed by host states may reduce this (Hoffman, 2017). More broadly, refugees are likely to be 
frustrated if there are no options for their future (e.g. resettlement).  
Education on conflict resolution may be effective (Jansen, 2011). Refugee communities are 
also likely to develop ways of getting along with each other through experience (Jansen, 2011; 
McConnachie, 2014). 
Refugee governance 
Most guidance and analysis points to the positive role of refugee governing and social 
structures within camps. McConnachie (2014) highlights the pre-camp identities, practices, 
political relationships and resilience strategies that help generate ‘order from within’ through 
committees, dispute resolution mechanisms, religious or cultural leaders, as well as laws from 
origin countries or drafted by non-state armed groups. As in prisons, outside security is more 
likely to be effective where those subject to it ‘consent to be governed’. She also notes that non-
state actors can commit to international standards, such as the Karen National Union signing 
Deeds of Commitment on the protection of women and children (McConnachie, 2014, p. 100). 
The discussion and resolution of political issues is seen as a factor increasing security. Refugees 
should be allowed to access news on the political situation and free discussion should be 
encouraged (Durieux, 2000). Conversely, banning political activity can be counterproductive in 
that it can harden militant views among refugees, whereas free discussion can allow multiple 
views to circulate (McConnachie, 2014, p. 99).  
Community police and justice 
Community police and informal justice systems are widely shown to be important 
components of camp order. However, their position as refugees and enforcers of rules set by 
the host state can create tensions in their role (Brankamp, 2020). Community authorities may 
prevent refugees from reporting crimes to the Kenyan police (Jansen, 2011, p. 71). They may 
also display bias towards certain groups within a camp (Crisp, 2001).  
Good quality justice services are needed to reduce crime. UNHCR guidance recognises that 
many camps are likely to show a mixture of justice systems, including refugee rules, formal 
grievance committees, conflict resolution mechanisms, traditional forms of justice, and the 
system of justice of the host state (UNHCR, 2006, p. 27). These systems of justice may vary in 
quality, and measures to improve them and build capacity should be employed. Traditional and 
informal systems are likely to be more suitable for petty crimes. However, it can be difficult to 
reconcile informal and traditional forms of justice used within camps with host state or 
international norms. Moreover, resources are required to provide refugees with access to host 
state justice. 
For example, McConnachie (2014) charts efforts by the UNHCR and the International Rescue 
Committee to launch an ‘administration of justice’ programme in camps for Burmese refugees in 
Thailand. The camps have existed since the 1980s and have strong refugee-led administrations, 
and are supported by an NGO consortium (the Border Consortium). The programme was to 
provide access to legal assistance and harmonise informal camp laws with national law in camps 
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for Cambodians in Thailand. The programme encouraged consultation with Thai police and 
referral of serious cases, legal assistance centres providing education and help to refugees, 
training of camp administration, recruitment of refugees as paralegals, and consultation with 
refugees. The informal refugee justice systems were amenable to reform, being respected and 
with limited violence or corruption. However, difficulties arose over which crimes could be dealt 
with in camp, and which needed to be referred to Thai law, with UNHCR showing less flexibility in 
allowing more crimes to be dealt with in camps. The programme was renamed ‘developing 
mediation and legal standards’ (McConnachie, 2014, p. 121). This was to avoid questions of 
legal sovereignty. In practice, refugees had limited access to Thai courts. 
The use of private contractors 
The UNHCR and other humanitarian organisations have used private contractors to 
provide security. This can create significant legal, operational and reputational risks (Cockayne, 
2006).  
Contracting arrangements and oversight need to be clear. In Zaire in the 1990s, during the 
Rwandan genocide, UNHCR’s Opération pour Securité dans les Camps employed “international 
military advisers (the ‘Camp Security Liaison Group’ or ‘CSLG’) to liaise with Zairian troops 
guarding and policing refugee camps following the Rwandan genocide” (Cockayne, 2006, p. 7). 
The UNHCR paid Zairian soldiers but rejected the idea of directly employing a security force. 
However, it was found that the CSLG failed “to adequately control the practice of the Zairian 
troops it effectively subcontracted security work to” (Cockayne, 2006, p. 7). Rather than curbing 
the power of extremists in control of the camps, the force provided a buffer against external 
threats to their control. Cockayne (2006) highlights “weak monitoring and controls” over the 
security force. 
The use of host state security forces 
Security packages involving increased support from host state police can be effective. 
However, many host states lack the means to provide security, so it is recognised that the 
international community may support extra policing through funding or training. It is also 
important the policing is of an adequate standard and training on protection issues if offered. In 
poor countries, police in camps funded by UNHCR or other international donors may have 
comparatively higher pay, creating tensions with other national police. The isolation of many 
camps may mean extra pay is required as an incentive. Many host countries are poor and lack 
police anyway, so recruiting extra police for camps may reduce policing elsewhere (Crisp, 2001). 
The example of Canadian police training security forces in Guinea shows the importance 
of host state commitment and proper agreements between implementing partners over 
responsibilities. UNHCR has an important role in advocating for refugee protection, which they 
neglected in this case (LeBlanc & Herrman, 2005). 
The need for adequate protection staff and effective co-operation 
UNHCR has a crucial role in providing sufficient staff to monitor protection concerns and training 
security staff. In Guinea, it failed to provide protection training for security staff as it believed 
another partner was providing this (LeBlanc and Herrman, 2005). In Uganda, it did not have 
sufficient protection capacity (Janmyr, 2014, p. 289). Co-operation between field security staff 
and UNHCR protection staff is necessary (Crisp, 2001). 




Humanitarian organisations managing camps have several alternatives in situations 
where militarisation is being driven by the dynamics of conflict, but ultimately cannot 
control the situation. Lischer (2005, p. 128) gives the example of war in Bosnia, where UNHCR 
interpreted its role narrowly and thereby “ignored militant activity that occurred outside of the 
camps”, and that aid was sustaining the army. Humanitarian organisations may employ private 
diplomacy to persuade governments or public attempts to raise violations of humanitarian law. 
They may also withdraw support. 
It is much harder to address political causes of insecurity through camp management. 
Moreover, many aspect of security - functions undertaken by police and militaries - are beyond 
the remit and capabilities of humanitarian organisations. Therefore an important part of camp 
management is liaison with other actors. For humanitarian non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) running a camp, this may mean liaison with national governments and security forces, as 
well as the UNHCR and refugee committees. It may also mean sub-contracting certain functions. 
Relations with states are highly important, as host states are responsible for camp 
security in international law and are more likely to have the capacity to exercise hard 
security functions. However, in most cases, “UNHCR, NGOs and donors can only pressure 
host governments to provide the needed protection” (Jacobsen, 1999, p. 8). In many cases, state 
positions make it very difficult to enforce security. Jacobsen (1999) points to a number of 
situations where host states have allowed or encouraged camp militarisation in their interests, 
including Thai toleration of Khmer Rouge fighters and Tanzanian toleration of FRELIMO fighters 
from Mozambique and Burundian fighters (Jacobsen, 1999, p. 7). In a civil war, the attitude of the 
receiving state is the most important factor in refugee militarisation (Lischer, 2005). Lischer 
(2005, p. 139) also points to the importance of a ‘long-term alternative’ for persuading refugee 
fighters to renounce violent means, which is most likely to be enabled by a peace agreement. 
Janmyr highlights the difficulties of UNHCR’s position when the government forcibly relocated 
refugees in Uganda, and notes its limited options: quiet diplomacy, reporting on violations, or 
physical withdrawal (Janmyr, 2014, p. 296). In Thailand, UN agencies were ineffective in 
persuading the Khmer Rouge to allow them humanitarian access to camps. The use of an 
agency ‘with no clear mandate’, the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO), had the 
effect of allowing some camps to become militarised (Robinson, 2000). 
Several authors highlight the potential to advocate for the humanitarian and civilian 
nature of camps with conflict parties (Durieux, 2000; McConnachie, 2018). This may be 
easier if credible peace negotiations are ongoing.  Diplomacy may be required to reach an 
agreement with host state governments. For example, Durieux (2000) highlights the careful 
language used in the memorandum of understanding between the Tanzanian government and 
UNHCR in agreeing on measures to improve camp security, while avoiding stating that the 
camps were ‘militarised’. 
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